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Comments
Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether a Medical
Treatment Necessarily Incurred Should Be
Excluded from Coverage Under a Health Insurance
Policy Provision Which Excludes from Coverage
"Experimental" Medical Treatments?
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of health care and its cost to the individual taxpayer
as well as to the state and federal governments is currently on the
political forefront and rightfully so. Health economists predict that
the United States will spend at least $939 billion on health care
this year,1 which is greater than twelve percent of the United
States gross national product.2 Boiled down this means that health
care in the United States averages $2700 per capita for every man,
woman and child in the country,3 more than twice as much as most
developed nations spend on health care per person.4 Equally as sig-
nificant, sources predict that the country will spend up to $1.6 tril-
lion on health care by the year 2000.1
One means by which health insurance providers have attempted
1. Governors Tackle Health Issue, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette A6 (January 30, 1993).
The cost of health care has increased more than 1000 percent in the last thirty years. James
S. Cline and Keith A. Rosten, The Effect of Policy Language on the Containment of Health
Care Cost, 21 Tort & Ins L J 120, 120 (1986).
2. Jack Torry, Health Care Needs a Fix, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 4 (February 16,
1992).
3. Sullivan Says Bush's Plan Would Control Health Costs, Pittsburgh Press A4
(February 3, 1992)
4. Sullivan Says Bush's Plan Would Control Health Costs, Pittsburgh Press at A4.
5. Id.
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to decrease the high cost of health care is by the inclusion in their
policies of exclusionary provisions which expressly preclude cover-
age for certain medical treatments necessarily incurred. More spe-
cifically, many health insurance policies expressly exclude from
coverage, and thus refuse to pay for, medical treatments which are
medically necessary to a patient's recovery from illness but which
are arguably "experimental" in nature.6 What this means, from a
practical viewpoint, is that where an insurer refuses to pay for an
allegedly "experimental" medical treatment necessarily undergone,
either the insured-patient must sue the insurer, the patient or the
hospital. must pay for the oft-expensive treatment, or the insured-
patient must forego the necessary treatment with all the accompa-
nying ramifications. While exact numbers are not available, it
seems apparent that few eligible insured-patients ever sue their in-
surers when recovery or reimbursement is denied; the reason for
this inaction is that the insured-patients and their families often
do not have either the monetary resources or the time available to
take legal action against the insurer.
Importantly, the denial by insurers of payment for allegedly "ex-
perimental" medical treatments is not a new approach to curbing
health care costs. Such provisions have been present in the insur-
ance industry for years. What is new, rather, is the increasing zeal
and ease with which insurers are using these exclusionary clauses
to deny their insureds recovery of medical expenses incurred. As
one article explained:
Until recently, "the policy exclusion for experimental and investigational
procedures was used primarily to protect third-party payers against the oc-
casional odd-ball or maverick medical therapy".. . . But now, these suits
are no longer about [for example,] anti-neoplaston therapy to be delivered
in a Bahamian clinic. . . ." More often they are about [procedures such as]
6. Although these exclusionary provisions are today common in health insurance
policies, there currently is no accepted definition of "experimental treatment." Dale H.
Cowan, Innovative Therapy versus Experimentation, 21 Tort & Ins L J 619, 629-32 (1986).
This is because medical technology changes so rapidly that a set definition would unreason-
ably limit insurers. For an idea of the lay meaning of the term, Webster's Dictionary defined
"experimental" as that which "is of ... or relating to an experiment." Webster's II New
Riverside University Dictionary 454 (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1984). "Experiment" was then
defined as "a test performed ... to ascertain the efficacy of something previously untried."
For an example of how scholars have defined the term, M.L. Norton described experimental
procedures to be those "that are untested or unproven with respect to clinical efficacy, or
are by their very nature not related to the therapy of the patient but rather performed
solely for the purpose of obtaining scientific data." M.L. Norton, When Does An Experi-




high dose chemotherapy with autologous cell rescue to be provided by pres-
tigious American universities and medical centers."'
As stated, the primary reason for this change is economic.
As the above article suggests, when one thinks of "experimental"
medical treatments, a common reaction is to envision a medical
shaman hoodwinking a beguiled patient into believing that a pla-
cebo concoction will cure his ails, and, therefore, the fact that the
insurer refuses to pay for such a treatment appears reasonable and
just. Over the years, however, insurers have wrongfully considered
a variety of now common medical treatments to be "experimental,"
and thus have attempted to refuse to pay for such medically im-
portant treatments. Included in the list of treatments which insur-
ers have alleged at one point in time to be "experimental" are acu-
puncture, sex change operations, AIDS treatments, gastric
stapling, many types of transplants such as liver and bone marrow
transplants, in vitro fertilization and various cancer treatments.8
Consequently, given that many of the medical treatments insurers
claim to be "experimental" are treatments for which the insured-
patients reasonably would expect to be reimbursed by their insur-
ers, the importance of insurers labeling medical treatments as "ex-
perimental" becomes more understandable.
The coverage or non-coverage of experimental medical treat-
ments by health insurance policies and the litigation which has en-
sued therefrom is the topic of this comment. The comment will
first examine the chaos both the insured-patient and the insurer
face when forced to litigate a claim for payment of an allegedly
experimental medical treatment necessarily undergone. Although
one author posits that "while policies today are generally more
precisely worded. . .it is difficult for insurers and self-insured em-
ployers to win cases in which desperately ill patients litigate over
payment for experimental medical treatments," this author dis-
agrees.9 Research completed reveals that the courts across the
7. Christine Woolsey, Medical Care Advances Pose Tough Decisions for Self-Insur-
ers, Business Insurance 3 (June 22, 1992).
8. See Comment, Undefined Experimental Exclusions in Health Insurance Con-
tracts: A Proposal For Judicial Response, 66 Wash L Rev 809, 813 (1990) for a list of those
cases in which insurers alleged these treatments to be experimental.
9. Judy Greenwald, Insuring Untried Treatment; Despite Exclusions, Courts Often
Find For Claimant, Business Insurance 2 (November 25, 1991). For example, much of this
type of litigation currently centers upon whether insurers should have to pay for HDC/
ABMT, an expensive but seemingly effective new treatment for breast cancer; of the cases
dealing with this issue, insured-patients have prevailed over their insurers only in approxi-
mately sixty percent of the cases. Gary Taylor, Cancer Treatment Focus of Suits, The Na-
1993
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country, both at the state and federal levels, have rendered deci-
sions in this area which completely span the spectrum of potential
results. No party involved in these litigations holds an advantage
over any other party. Rather, both are disadvantaged under the
present system because of this uncertainty of result. The comment
will then conclude with suggestions for improving this controver-
sial area of insurance reimbursement litigation.
II. WHY INSURERS SEEK TO EXCLUDE EXPERIMENTAL MEDICAL
TREATMENTS
The primary reason insurers seek to exclude experimental medi-
cal treatments from coverage under health insurance policies is to
limit their financial liability and keep the cost of insurance down. 10
Such a rationale is neither surprising nor irrational given the high
cost of many allegedly "experimental" treatments. For example, a
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania hospital noted that the cost to its pa-
tients for a liver transplant was in the range of $208,000.11 Simi-
larly, the cost of an autologous bone marrow transplant accompa-
nied by high dose chemotherapy, a cancer treatment, typically
costs between $130,000 and $140,000.12 Thus, so the argument
goes, forcing insurers to pay for such expensive treatments, regard-
less of whether they are experimental or not, would cause the price
tional Law Journal 3 (January 25, 1993).
10. Comment, 66 Wash L Rev at 812. A spokesman for Blue Cross and Blue Shield
stated that forcing insurers such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield to pay for experimental
medical treatments would cost the insurance industry hundreds of millions of extra dollars.
Debate Grows Over Rationing Medical Care, Wall St J B1, col 6 (March 27, 1990). The
argument is that once any insurer pays for a treatment, it is no longer considered experi-
mental and therefore, all insurers must pay for the treatment, regardless of its effectiveness.
One example of where this has occurred is in the payment of pancreas transplants for
diabetics. Such transplants are now regularly paid for by insurers even though "there is
general agreement that the data as to the effectiveness of a transplant-compared with
traditional insulin therapy-is 'totally inadequate.' " Greenwald, Business Insurance at 2,
citing Dr. Tom Halloran, director of the office of health technology assessment at the federal
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. (cited in note 9).
11. Steve Creedy, Transplant Costs Lead to Thicket of Red Tape, Pittsburgh Press 5
(January 24, 1992).
12. An autologous bone marrow transplant is "'a process in which a portion of a
patient's bone marrow is obtained by needle aspirations. . . . The aspirated marrow is
placed in storage for intravenous infusion following a marrow-toxic or ablative regimen of
chemotherapy and/or radiopathy for the purpose of treating malignancy'. . . . Stated more
simply, the patient's bone marrow is harvested-or removed-with the patient then able to
receive vastly increased doses of chemotherapy and radiation therapy which would have
destroyed the bone marrow had the bone marrow not been removed for, of all body tissues,
the marrow is the one most sensitive to and most damaged by chemotherapy." Rollo v Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of New. Jersey, 1990 WL 312647, 2 (D NJ).
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of insurance to sky-rocket so high that few would be able to afford
health insurance. Given the large numbers of already uninsured
and underinsured individuals in the United States today, clearly
this, the argument continues, is not desirable. s
Besides keeping the cost of health insurance down, the use of
such exclusionary provisions is seen as encouraging the rendering
of safe and effective medical treatments and the elimination of
worthless treatments from the medical field." This the insurer
achieves by refusing to pay for unsafe and ineffective treatments
while willingly paying for safe and effective medical procedures.
Thus the situation presents, as one scholar so accurately de-
scribed, "an inherent tension between an insured's legitimate ex-
pectation that coverage will be provided unless a specific exclusion
applies, and the insurance company's legitimate desire to reduce
unnecessary medical treatment and provide insurance at a reason-
able cost. '15 As stated above, the ultimate goal of this comment is
to suggest options so as to alleviate some of this tension.
III. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
In deciding whether a disputed medical treatment is covered
under the terms of a health insurance policy, the courts apply cer-
tain traditional principles of contract and insurance law. In a nut-
shell, these principles are that: (1) since an insurance policy is a
13. Currently there are thirty-six million Americans who are uninsured. Governors
Tackle Health Issue, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette at A6 (cited in note 1).
14. Paul Molino, Reimbursement Disputes Involving Experimental Medical Treat-
ment, 11 J Health & Hosp L 329, 329 (November, 1991). This function some scholars have
labeled as a "gatekeeping" function. See Grace Powers Monaco and Rebecca Burke, Insurer
as Gatekeeper: Handling Claims for Unproven Methods Of Medical Management, 18 Fo-
rum 591 (1983); and Grace Monaco and Rebecca Burke, Insurer as Gatekeeper-Part Two.
Policy Obstacles In Unproven Method Litigation, 20 Forum 400 (1985). As one court
explained:
the denial of coverage by defendant [insurer] for the Gerson therapy [the insured-
patient] received . . .will not discourage the development and acceptance of legiti-
mate innovative methods of treating cancer. It will, rather, have the desirable effect
of affording greater protection to the general public, and in particular, cancer patients
who are especially vulnerable to unfounded claims of miraculous cures. Specifically,
our decision will insure that the treatment rendered on behalf of patients is adminis-
tered in facilities comporting with certain minimal standards and that its effective-
ness has been adequately demonstrated by studies conducted in accordance with ap-
propriate scientific methodology before the resources of a major health insurer are
utilized to support it.
Zuckerberg v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, 108 AD2d 56, 62, 487
NYS2d 595 (1985). See notes 32-35 and the accompanying text for further discussion of the
Zuckerberg decision.
15. Cline and Rosten, 21 Tort & Ins L J at 123 (cited in note 1).
1993
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contract, the court must ascertain the parties intent as manifested
in the language of the contract;16 (2) the conditions and exceptions
of an insurance contract are to be construed strictly against the
insurer and liberally in favor of the insured-patient;7 (3) all ambi-
guities18 are to construed against the insurance company and in
favor of the insured-patient;' (4) the burden is on the insurer to
establish that the policy does not cover the asserted dispute; 20 and
(5) where the policy's language is not ambiguous, the court may
not reinterpret the coverage.21 The basic rationale behind these
principles is that the insurer wrote the policy and is in a superior
bargaining position to the insured-patient and, therefore, has more
control over the terms of the contract.22
IV. THE VARIOUS ANALYSES USED AND RESULTS CONCLUDED BY
THE COURTS IN THIS AREA
The courts have expressly recognized the importance of such ex-
clusionary provisions from both an economic and public policy
viewpoint and have had no difficulty in enforcing the insurer's po-
16. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company, 529 F Supp 194, 197 (ED Pa 1981).
17. McLaughlin v Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 565 F Supp 434, 440 (ND
Cal 1983).
18. One court explained that:
a provision of an insurance contract is ambiguous if reasonably intelligent individuals
on considering it in the context of the entire policy would honestly differ as to its
meaning and if alternative or more precise language, if used, would have put the
meaning of the language beyond a reasonable question.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company,
529 F Supp 194, 197 (ED Pa 1981).
19. Waldrip v Connecticut National Life Insurance, 566 S2d 434, 437 (La App 5th
Cir 1990). Stated in greater detail by the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, and where the contract is susceptible
of two constructions, the construction most favorable to the insured must be adopted.
Standardized or printed contracts are interpreted most strongly against the party
preparing the form. The rule of strict construction against the drafter of the instru-
ment is particularly applicable in the case of a contract drawn by an expert or exper-
ienced party [such as an insurance company].
Wilson v The Travelers Insurance Co., 605 P2d 1327, 1329 (Ok 1980). See notes 43-45 and
the accompanying text for a discussion of the Waldrip case and notes 27-29 and the accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Wilson case.
20. McLaughlin, 565 F Supp at 441 (cited in note 17).
21. Mortgage Bancorp v New Hampshire Insurance Co., 67 Or App 261, 264, 677
P2d 726, 728 (1984).
22. Comment, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions In Health Insurance
Contracts, 66 Wash L Rev at 815. (cited in note 8). See also Wilson v The Travelers Insur-
ance Co, 605 P2d 1327, 1329 (Ok 1980). For a discussion of Wilson, see notes 27-29 and the
accompanying text.
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sition of non-payment when the insurer has properly refused to
pay for an experimental medical treatment.2 Admittedly, making
such decisions is not an easy task for the courts. As one court ex-
plained the seriousness of such decisions:
When the parties were first before me less than six weeks ago, I was called
upon to decide whether eight year old Tishna Rollo could live or whether
she must die, a humbling and sobering decision. Tishna, I was told, had
virtually no chance of surviving the relapsed Wilms' tumor from which she
is-suffering and Blue Cross/ Blue Shield had denied coverage for autologous
bone marrow transplant ("ABMT") with accompanying high dose chemo-
therapy, a treatment which could well prolong and quite possibly save her
life and which, concededly, provided her only hope of either....24
Essentially there are three scenarios which an insured-patient
seeking reimbursement from her insurer for an allegedly experi-
mental treatment can face. One possible scenario is that the pa-
tient's insurance policy does not contain an exclusionary provision
which expressly precludes coverage of "experimental" medical
treatments. Such a scenario is rare today. Another option is that
the health insurance policy may contain both an exclusionary pro-
vision and a definition of what qualifies as an "experimental" med-
ical treatment under that provision. The final scenario is that the
insurance policy may contain such an exclusionary provision, but
lack a definition of the term "experimental;" this description ex-
emplifies the language of most health insurance policies today. De-
pending upon which is the applicable factual scenario, as this com-
ment will explain at length, the insured-patient's chances of
recovering from her insurer will vary greatly.
A. Scenario I: When an Insurance Policy Lacks an Exclusionary
Provision which Expressly Precludes Coverage of Experimental
Medical Treatments
Today most health insurance policies contain exclusionary provi-
sions which specifically exclude "experimental" medical treatments
23. As stated by the court.in Rollo v Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Jersey, 1990 WL
312647:
It is reasonable, and, indeed, necessary for Blue Cross/Blue Shield to have an experi-
mental/investigative exclusion, for subscriber premiums should not have to pay for
procedures which are purely experimental or investigative or subsidize every scientist
stirring a magic potion in some laboratory at the top of a mountain with lightning
flashing about.
Rollo, 1990 WL 312647 at 7.
24. Id at 1. Notably, the court found in favor of the insured-patient, Tishna.
1993
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from their coverage terms.2 5 The prevalence of such exclusionary
provisions is due to the general holding of the courts that where
health insurance policies lack provisions which expressly exclude
experimental medical treatments from coverage, the insurer must
reimburse the insured-patient for any experimental medical treat-
ments necessarily undergone.
The courts have reached this conclusion by applying the basic
contract and insurance law principles stated earlier in this com-
ment. Specifically, the courts have construed the coverage clauses
broadly, the exclusion clauses narrowly and have resolved the am-
biguity, the lack of a specific provision precluding coverage of ex-
perimental medical treatments, in favor of the insured-patient.
An example of the foregoing analysis can be seen in the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma's decision in Wilson v The Travelers Insur-
ance Company.27 In Wilson, the insured-patient sought recovery of
the cost of laetrile treatments28 she incurred to help cure her lung
cancer. The court held that because the insurance policy in ques-
tion did not specifically exclude or limit the coverage of experi-
mental drugs, the ambiguity had to be resolved in favor of the in-
sured. Thus, the insured-patient was reimbursed by the insurer. In
so holding, the court reasoned that "[t]he insurance contract could
have precluded payment for illegal drugs or experimental drugs, or
provided that all drugs must have been declared safe and effective
by the FDA before they could be covered expenses under the con-
tract. It did not do So.
'29
25. Comment, 66 Wash L Rev at 815 (cited in note 8).
26. See notes 16-21 and the accompanying text.
27. Wilson v The Travelers Insurance Co., 605 P2d 1327 (Ok 1980). For examples of
other courts' analyses of Scenario I cases see Dallis v Aetna Life Insurance Co., 574 F Supp
547, 552 (ND Ga 1983), af'd 768 F2d 1303 (11th Cir 1985) ("To adopt the definition defend-
ant tenders, i.e. 'recognized as potentially efficious and safe by the medical community, in-
cluding all significant branches and agencies therein which are concerned with treatment of
cancer,' would be for this court to provide defendant with protection it failed to provide for
itself."), and McLaughlin v Connecticut General Life Insurance Co, 565 F Supp 434, 449
(ND Ca 1983) ("[Tlhe [insurance company] could have reserved the right to require pre
treatment screening for experimental therapies or drugs [but did not do so].").
28. The term "laetrile" is:
[a] trademark for 1-mandelonitrile-B-glucuronic acid, derived by hydrolyses of amyg-
dalin and oxidation of the resulting l-mandelonitrile-B-glucoside; it is alleged to have
anti-neoplastic properties. The term is sometimes used interchangeably with
amygdalin.
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 709 (W.B. Saunders Co., 26th ed 1981).
29. Wilson, 605 P2d at 1329.
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B.. Scenario II: When an Insurance Policy Contains Both a Pro-
vision Precluding Coverage of Experimental Medical Treatments
and a Definition of What Treatments Qualify as "Experimental"
Medical Treatments
1. General Rule
As a general rule, when a health insurance policy expressly pre-
cludes coverage of experimental medical treatments and defines
what types of medical treatments qualify as "experimental,"30 a
court will not inject into its analysis of the case its own opinion of
what is "experimental." This approach is in line with the earlier
stated rule that "f[it is not permissible to apply a strained meaning
to unambiguous language to create ambiguity where none exists so
that interpretation may be indulged to extend coverage. ' 31 The
court will look only at whether the disputed medical treatment
falls within the scope of the insurer's definition of precluded exper-
imental procedures. If, based upon the policy's definition, the
treatment qualifies as "experimental," then the court will find for
the insurer and deny the insured-patient's claim for damages. Con-
versely, if the treatment does not qualify under the policy's defini-
tion as being "experimental," then the insured-patient's claim will
prevail and the insurer will have to reimburse the insured-patient
for her medical expenses.
An example of how a court typically will look only at whether
the disputed medical treatment falls within the scope of the in-
surer's definition of precluded experimental procedures is Zuck-
erberg v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York. 32 In
Zuckerberg, the insured-patient, diagnosed as having cancer, had
engaged in a nutritionally based cancer treatment called "Gerson
therapy" and sought reimbursement from his insurer for such
treatment." The insurer denied the insured-patient's claim on the
ground that the insurance policy excluded coverage for medical
30. An example of such an exclusionary provision is that of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Greater New York which stated that a procedure was experimental if it was "ex-
perimental in the sense that its effectiveness is not generally recognized." Zuckerberg v Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, 108 AD2d 56, 61, 487 NYS2d 595 (1985). See
notes 32-35 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the Zuckerberg case.
31. Mortgage Bancorp v New Hampshire Insurance Co., 677 P2d at 728 (cited in
note 21).
32. Zuckerberg v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, 108 AD2d 56,
487 NYS2d 595 (1985).
33. Zuckerberg, 108 AD2d at 57. The case explained Gerson therapy as involving "a
dietary regime consisting of large numbers of organically grown fruits and vegetables and
their juices, together with certain medications, digestive aids and vitamins." Id.
1993 785
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procedures that were "experimental in the sense that its effective-
ness is not generally recognized. '34 The policy further stated that
"[a] procedure will be covered if an appropriate governmental
agency, Federal or New York State, recognizes it as sufficiently ef-
fective to justify any risks that may be involved."3
Applying the general principles of contract and insurance law
enumerated earlier, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York held that the insurer had sustained its burden of es-
tablishing that the effectiveness of the therapy received by the in-
sured was not generally recognized by the medical community and
therefore, the insurer had validly denied coverage.36 Notably, the
court expressed no independent opinion as to the insurer's defini-
tion of "experimental" procedures.
A similar analysis was utilized by the Alabama Supreme Court
in Griffis v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama.3 7 In Griffis,
the insured had undergone a "Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
Scan"3 8 for "staging" the progression of prostrate cancer. The in-
surer refused to provide coverage for the treatment upon the
ground that the patient's insurance policy contained a paragraph
which excluded benefits for procedures which were "experimental"
or "investigative" and the insurer opined that MRI scans for pros-
trate cancer fell within that realm.3 9 The "Definition" section of
the insured's policy stated that:
12. "Experimental" or "investigative" means any treatment, procedure, fa-
cility, equipment, drugs, drug usage, or supplies either (a) not recognized by
us as having scientifically established medical value and being in accordance
with generally accepted standards of medical practice, or (b) not approved
34. Id at 61.
35. Id at 62.
36. Id at 61-62.
37. Griffis v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 390 S2d 267 (Ala Civ App
1991).
38. The following is an elementary description of an MRI:
An MRI device produce[s] a picture of the inside of your body .... MRI uses
magnetism and radio waves ... to produce its image. Th[e] picture is clearer than
ordinary x-rays . . . [and] does not use ionizing radiation as do conventional x-rays
and CT scans.
MRI is based on magnetic properties in the interior (nucleus) of all atoms, includ-
ing those in living tissue. When radio waves are directed to a specific part of your
body, they cause the nuclei of atoms to give off energy. This energy is detected, and a
computer translates that emerging pattern of magnetic energy into an image that
[the] radiologist can interpret.
David E. Larson, ed, Mayo Clinic Family Health Book 1287 (William Morrow & Co., Inc.
1990).
39. Griffis, 390 S2d at 267-68.
786 Vol. 31:777
Comments
by a governmental agency from which approval is required.'
0
At trial, the issue was whether the MRI scan was "experimental"
under the terms of the policy. The jury found the treatment was
not "experimental."41 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's holding and stated that "there was evidence that the
MRI did have 'scientifically established medical value' and was in
accord with 'generally accepted standards of medical practice.'
Such testimony was provided by the radiologist. . .and the in-
sured's treating physician ... "42 As with the Zuckerberg court,
the Griffis court expressed no opinion as to the quality of the in-
surer's definition; it merely applied the factual history of the dis-
puted medical procedure, as presented by expert medical wit-
nesses, to the definition contained in the insurance policy.
2. Exception to the General Rule
The insured-patient's only chance of obtaining reimbursement
for an experimental medical treatment necessarily undergone when
the policy contains a definition of what constitutes excluded "ex-
perimental" treatments is if the court determines the insurer's def-
inition is ambiguous. 43 This is because some courts which have de-
clared an insurance policy's definition to be ambiguous have
subsequently found that the ambiguity must necessarily be re-
solved in favor of the insured-patient and the insured-patient thus
be reimbursed.
One such case was Waldrip v Connecticut National Life Insur-
ance." In Waldrip, the insured-patient, who had terminal liver
dysfunction caused by chronic hepatitis, brought suit against his
insurer to obtain payment of a liver transplant. The insurer re-
fused to provide coverage for the transplant on the ground that a
liver transplant was considered "experimental" and, therefore, was
not covered under the insured's health insurance policy. The policy
in question stated that "experimental" meant:
care, treatment, services or supplies not approved or accepted as essential to
the treatment of injury or sickness by any of the following:
(1) the American Medical Association;
(2) The United States Surgeon General;
40. Id at 268.
41. Id.
42. Id at 270.
43. See note 18 and the accompanying text for a definition of "ambiguous."




(3) the United States Department of Public Health; or
(4) The National Institute of Health.'8
The insured-patient counter-argued that because the exclusionary
language referred to extrinsic determinations, it was impossible for
anyone examining the language of the policy, including the insurer,
to determine whether or not liver transplants were covered under
the policy.
The court ultimately agreed with the insured-patient's argument
and stated:
[w]e . . . find the provision in question so ambiguous that even [the in-
surer] was unable to determine quickly whether or not liver transplants con-
stituted "experimental" treatment. Exclusions from coverage must be clear
and unmistakable, and any ambiguity must be construed against the insurer
and in favor of coverage.4"
Thus, because the exclusionary clause's definition of experimental
was deemed ambiguous, the insured-patient prevailed.
C. Scenario III: When an Insurance Policy Contains a Provision
Expressly Precluding Coverage of Experimental Medical Treat-
ments, But Does Not Contain a Definition of What Types of Med-
ical Treatments Qualify as "Experimental"
1. Approach #1: Lack of a Definition in the Insurance Policy
of what Constitutes an "Experimental" Medical Procedure
Equates to an Ambiguity in the Policy and Therefore the
Insured-Patient Necessarily Prevails
As in Scenario II where the insurance policy contains both an
exclusionary provision and a definition of what treatments qualify
as "experimental," when an insurance policy expressly precludes
coverage of experimental medical treatments but fails to define in
the policy what the term "experimental" means, some courts have
held that absent a definition of what types of treatments qualify as
"experimental," the exclusionary provision is ambiguous and,
therefore, must be construed against the insurer and in favor of
the insured. An example of such an analysis can be seen in
DiDomenico v Employers Cooperative Industry Trust.47 In
DiDomenico, the insured-patient sought coverage under his insur-
45. Waldrip, 566 S2d at 435.
46. Id at 437.




ance plan for a liver transplant. The insurance plan provided both
that: (1) "organ transplants" were "covered charges"" s and (2)
"transplants which are considered experimental" were not covered,
explaining that transplants which were not considered experimen-
tal included "transplants of . . .a liver (for a child under age
12)." 9 The insurer refused coverage upon the ground that a liver
transplant would be, because the insured-patient was over twelve
years in age, "experimental" under the terms of the plan. 50
The court ultimately held that the plan's language relating to
organ transplants was ambiguous and, thus, the insurer had to re-
imburse the insured-patient for all expenses incurred in obtaining
a liver transplant.5 1 In so holding, the court explained that:
With respect to medical plans, if an ambiguity exists, the terms of the pol-
icy "should be interpreted most favorabl[y] to the insured. . . ." (citation
omitted) Ambiguous provisions should be construed "to further the policy's
basic purpose of indemnity." (citation omitted) If the language of a policy is
ambiguous the court must construe the policy against the party who drafted
its terms (citation omitted).
5
1
2. Approach #2: Lack of a Definition in the Insurance Policy
of what Constitutes an "Experimental" Medical Procedure
Gives the Court the Freedom to Create its own Definition of
"Experimental"
Other courts, when faced with the situation where a health in-
surance policy precludes coverage of "experimental" medical pro-
cedures but does not define what the term "experimental" means,
have chosen to create their own definition of what is the term's
meaning. In making this determination, the courts have considered
a variety of factors including:
the treatment's high cost, testimony from experts in the specialty area, the
patient's condition and the lack of alternative treatments, the approval and
acceptance of the components of the treatment, the use of research proto-
cols, consensus in professional medical literature regarding the treatment's
effectiveness, how well-known a treatment is and its duration of use, and
48. DiDomenico, 676 F Supp at 905.
49. Id. Specifically, the policy provided: "Not Covered: Transplants which are consid-
ered experimental or are done for purposes of research. Transplants of a kidney, cornea or a
liver (for a child' under age 12) are not considered experimental." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id at 909. The court stated "[t]he language of the Plan relating to organ trans-
plants is, to engage in understatement, ambiguous." Id at 907 (emphasis added).
52. Id at 908.
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lack of governmental approval.5 3
Then, having established this standard, these courts have deter-
mined whether, based upon the standard, the disputed treatment
was "experimental."
An example of a court creating its own definition of "experimen-
tal" medical treatments and then determining whether, based
upon the definition, the disputed treatment was within the scope
of the insurance policy is the New York state court case of Bradley
v Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield.5 4 In Bradley, the insured-
patient, who was HIV-positive, sought to compel his insurer to pay
for chemotherapy and a bone marrow transplant, both of which
the insured-patient's physician had recommended as medically
necessary. The insurer claimed the treatment was outside of the
scope of its contractual obligation to the insured-patient. The pol-
icy provided that "Blue Cross will not pay for services which are
deemed experimental or investigative according to guidelines es-
tablished jointly for the Empire Plan by the State of New York,
Blue Cross and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company."5 5 These
guidelines had never been established.
The court held that the chemotherapy and bone marrow trans-
plant were not "experimental." Significantly, the court stated that
because the guidelines had never been drawn, its holding was
based upon: (1) the expert medical testimony submitted which in-
dicated that chemotherapy and bone .marrow transplants were not
investigative treatments; (2) the strong likelihood of the treat-
ments' success; and (3) the irreparable harm that would result if
the treatments were not received."
The difficulty with the courts engaging in this type of analysis is
that the courts are merely substituting their own judgment for that
of the insurer as to which medical treatments should be covered
and which should be excluded. As this comment will expand upon,
53. Comment, 66 Wash L Rev at 816-17 (footnotes omitted) (cited in note 8). This
comment further noted that factors the courts have deemed not dispositive or not relevant
include "the American Medical Association's (AMA's) conclusion that the treatment is non-
experimental, lack of governmental approval, coverage by other insurers and Medicare, lack
of support in the literature, lack of randomized clinical studies, a death rate as high as
fifteen percent, and a success ratio of less than fifty percent." Id at 817.
54. Bradley v Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 149 Misc2d 20, 562 NYS2d 908
(1990). See also Pirozzi v Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia, 741 F Supp 586 (ED Va 1990)
and Sweeney v Gerber Products Company Medical Benefits Plan, 728 F Supp 594 (D Neb
1989).
55. Bradley, 562 NYS2d at 909.
56. Id at 910.
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such a result is not a "healthy" solution to this issue, given that
the judiciary's medical knowledge is extremely limited and the
ramifications of such decisions are so enormous.
V. WHAT ALL THIS MEANS TO THE INSURED-PATIENT AND THE
INSURER
The case law thus clearly shows that where an insured-patient
seeks reimbursement from the insurer for a medical treatment nec-
essarily undergone and the insurer refuses to pay on the ground
that the treatment is "experimental," every case will be evaluated
upon an individual basis, with the court examining the language of
the specific insurance policy and applying the policy's language to
the facts of the case under traditional principles of contract and
insurance law. 7 Consequently, whether an insured-patient can
compel the insurer to reimburse for an experimental medical treat-
ment necessarily undergone depends upon the language of the in-
sured-patient's health insurance policy. If the policy excludes cov-
erage of "experimental" medical treatments and defines what
treatments qualify as "experimental," so long as the policy's defini-
tion is not deemed ambiguous by the examining court, the insured-
patient cannot compel the insurer to reimburse for medical ex-
penses necessarily incurred unless the court finds the treatment
falls outside of the policy's definition of "experimental." Alterna-
tively, if the policy lacks a specific exclusionary clause, the court
almost certainly will compel the insurer to reimburse the insured-
patient. The dictates of contract and insurance law seem to require
such a decision. Finally, if the policy contains such an exclusionary
provision but lacks a definition of what is an "experimental" medi-
cal treatment or the court finds that the policy's definition is am-
biguous, then the court may decide that the insured-patient is en-
titled to recover under the policy. Significantly, however, the court
is not compelled by law so to decide.
To summarize, from the insured-patient's viewpoint these con-
clusions mean that typically, unless the insurance policy lacks an
exclusionary clause which expressly precludes coverage of experi-
57. An additional factor will come into play if the court is examining an employee
benefit plan subject to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
29 USC §§ 1001-1461 (1988); 38 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 832 (codified at 29 USC §§ 1001-
1461 (1982). ERISA cases generally use an "arbitrary and capricious standard of review" for
examining denials of medical reimbursements and therefore, it is less likely that the in-
sured-patient will prevail. For general information about ERISA in this area see Molino, 11
J Health & Hosp L at 331 (cited in note 14).
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mental medical treatments, the insured cannot be certain that liti-
gating the claim for reimbursement will compel the insurer to pay.
Rather, the best the insured-patient can hope for is that the policy
either lacks a definition of what "experimental" means under the
policy or contains an inadequate definition. As stated earlier, both
scenarios allow a court, if it so chooses, to construe the policy in
favor of the insured-patient. Similarly, the insurer can have no
idea of when it will be made to pay for a medical procedure it
opines to be "experimental" and when it will be excused from so
paying. In conclusion, there simply is no guarantee, as posited by
some authorities, that the sickly insured-patient will invariably
prevail over the insurer.5
VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE To REMEDY THIS CHAOTIC SITUATION?
Much of the uncertainty in this area of insurance reimbursement
litigation is due to the fact that the judiciary is being forced to
make decisions in an area in which it is clearly unqualified. The
judiciary typically has little medical background and yet it is mak-
ing medical decisions which unquestionably have life and death
consequences. Accordingly, the question which logically follows is
what can be done to end the chaos which faces the insurer and the
insured-patient in this area of litigation. The remainder of this
comment will focus on possible solutions to help end the current
unsettling situation.
A. The Option of Reducing the Judiciary's Role in Insurance
Reimbursement Litigation in Favor of Other Entities
There seems to be two possible paths which reform in the area of
insurance reimbursement litigation can take.59 One can either
choose to reform the judiciary review process of this area or one
can attempt to eliminate to a great extent the judiciary's currently
significant role in this area and substitute other entities in place
58. See note 9 and the accompanying text. Other scholars agree with this author's
opinion; see, for example, Cline and Rosten, 21 Tort & Ins lJ at 131 ("The only certainty in
this area is that one cannot predict the result in any individual case.") (cited in note 1).
59. Of course, reforming the language used by the insurance companies in writing
these exclusionary provisions so to make them as specific, unambiguous and objective as
possible also aids in correcting this problem. Indeed, the insurance companies have acknowl-
edged this and have been modifying these exclusionary clauses over the last ten years.
Greenwald, Business Insurance at 3 (cited in note 9). Observations of cases decided since
these reforms were made in the policies' language, however, indicate that such corrections
are not enough. Id. The unpredictability in the area of reimbursement litigation remains. Id.
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thereof. The entities most often suggested to take over in this area
are the federal or state legislatures or one of their regulatory agen-
cies, the insurance industry and the medical profession.
Most of the scholars in this area focus on reforming the judici-
ary's role and rightfully so." For none of the above listed entities
is currently in the proper position to take over the leading role in
this area. First, there is the legislative branch of government.
While some state legislatures have become tangentially involved in
this area of insurance reimbursement litigation by mandating that
insurers provide coverage for certain types of medical treatments 6'
and by allowing an insured-patient to bring a "bad faith" cause of
action when an insurer unreasonably, without just cause or in bad
faith refuses to reimburse an insured-patient's claim,62 research in-
dicates that it is unlikely that either the federal or state legisla-
tures or any of their regulatory agencies are going to step into this
area in the immediate future and take over the primary role in its
development and regulation. This fact is particularly disconcerting
as there is a strong reason for advocating that the legislative
branch should take over the primary role in this area. This argu-
ment is that "not only is the legislature better at debating the un-
derlying policy issues, but it is supposed to be [the] branch of the
government making the hard political decisions."6 3 An additional
60. See, for example, Paul Molino, Reimbursement Disputes Involving Experimental
Medical Treatments, 11 J Health & Hosp L 329 (November, 1991) and Comment, Unde-
fined Experimental Exclusions in Health Insurance Contracts: A Proposal For Judicial
Response, 66 Wash L Rev 809 (1991).
61. Astrid E. Ellis, Insurance Coverage for Innovative Medical Treatments, For The
Defense 9, 14 (September, 1992). For example, approximately one-half of the states require
coverage under certain types of insurance policies for infertility procedures. Ellis, For The
Defense at 14. Just one example is Illinois; that state has enacted legislation which requires
that group accident and health insurance policies which provide pregnancy related benefits
must also provide coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of in vitro fertilization, artificial
insemination and embryo transfer. Ill Rev Stat ch 73, para 968m, § 356m (1991). Id.
62. Included among those states which statutorily recognize a cause of action when
an insurer unreasonably, without just cause or in bad faith refuses to reimburse an insured-
patient's claim are: (1) Arkansas (Ark Stat Ann § 23-79-208 (1992)); (2) California (Cal Civ
Proc Code § 128.5 (West 1992)); (3) Florida (Fla Stat § 624.155 (1991)); (4) Georgia (Ga
Code Ann § 33-4-6 (Michie 1991)); (5) Hawaii (Hawaii Rev Stat § 431:10-242 (1991)); (6)
Kansas (Kan Stat Ann § 40-256 (1990)); (7) Louisiana (La Rev Stat Ann § 22:657A (West
1990)); (8) Missouri (Mo Rev Stat § 375.420 (1990)); (9) New Mexico (NM Stat Ann § 39-2-
1 (1992)); (10) Pennsylvania (42 Pa Con Stat Ann § 8371 (Purdon 1991)); (11) Virginia (Va
Code § 38.2-209 (1991)); and (12) Wyoming (Wyo Stat § 26-15-124 (1991)). Notably, Ala-
bama recognizes such a cause of action under its common law. See, for example, Griffis v
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 590 S2d 267 (Ala Civ App 1991).
63. Richard Saver, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why Are the Courts Judging
Experimental Medicine?, 44 Stan L Rev 1095, 1117 (May, 1992).
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compelling argument for having the federal government regulate
this area is that public payers and self-insured payers may not
have to comply with insurance regulations or state common law
principles.
Second, clearly the insurance industry should not be the entity
which determines whether or not any given medical treatment is
''experimental." One reason against such a reform is that given the
great expense of many of the new treatments, insurers have a fi-
nancial interest in categorizing such treatments as "experimental"
and therefore non-compensable.6 4 Accordingly, it is this author's
opinion that the insurance industry's role should be limited to
making its exclusionary provisions concerning experimental treat-
ments as specific as possible and then following the provisions to
the letter.6 5
Finally, it is this author's opinion that it would be improper to
leave the determination of what medical treatments are "experi-
mental" solely in the hands of the medical profession. There are
too many factors involved which could bias the medical profes-
sion's determination. Two such factors are: (1) faced with a termi-
nally ill patient with no other hope and little monetary resources,
the medical profession might feel ethically bound to determine
that the treatment recommended was not "experimental" so that
the patient could be treated and (2) the fewer number of treat-
ments considered "experimental," the more treatments that will be
performed and the more income physicians and hospitals will pro-
duce. Notably, this is not meant as a criticism of the medical pro-
fession. The medical profession should have an active role in as-
sisting in the determination of what medical procedures are
"experimental." This author opines, however, that this role should
be a subordinate one: doing research, writing articles and acting as
expert witnesses, all which aid the judiciary in learning the most
information possible about the disputed treatment.
,B. Reforming Judiciary Review of Insurance Reimbursement
Litigation
Thus, it is this author's opinion that while the above discussed
64. For example, if ABMT were declared nonexperimental for breast cancer, it is es-
timated that "25,000 women might want to use the procedure ... at a [total] cost of about
$2.5 billion." Saver, 44 Stan L Rev at 1114.
65. This practice of making exclusionary provisions as explicit as possible has now
become standard procedure in the health insurance industry. Greenwald, Business Insur-
ance at 3 (cited in note 9).
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entities should have an active role in this area of reimbursement
litigation, the primary role, at least for the present time, until the
state or federal legislatures or one of their regulatory agencies de-
cides to enter the picture and provide uniform exclusionary provi-
sion language (if indeed this is at all possible), should remain with
the judiciary. Changes in the judiciary review process are, however,
clearly needed. The remainder of this comment will be spent ex-
amining judicial reforms which this author hypothesizes will help
remedy the problem.
1. If There is no Definition of "Experimental" in the
Insurance Policy then the Insurer Automatically Loses
At the most basic level, the courts need to require insurers to
provide explicit definitions in their policies of what is meant by the
term "experimental." This can easily be achieved by establishing a
common law rule that where the term "experimental" is not de-
fined in the policy at all, the exclusionary clause is per se ambigu-
ous and, therefore, the court must find for the insured-patient
under the traditional principles of contract and insurance law. Sig-
nificantly, such a rule would be beneficial to both the insured-pa-
tient and the insurer. First, the insured-patient will have a better
idea of just what treatments are and are not covered in the insur-
ance policy. Second, both the insured-patient and the insurer will
not have to fear how the court will interpret the term "experimen-
tal." Third, the insurer will be more likely to prevail in the litiga-
tion where it does have such a definition than it would otherwise
because surely coverage denial predicated on a defined exclusion is
more likely to withstand judicial review.
2. Where a Definition of the Term "Experimental" Exists in
the Insurance Policy, the Court Should Require that it Contain
Some Sort of Reasonable Objective Criteria
In addition to establishing a common law rule that every insur-
ance policy must contain a definition of the term "experimental"
or the court will automatically hold for the insured-patient and re-
imbursement, the judiciary should also require that the insurer's
definition of "experimental" list, in addition to any specific exclu-
sions, reasonable objective criteria which the insurer and the re-
viewing court must look to whenever determining whether a given
medical procedure is "experimental." Such objective criteria can
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include medical literature on the treatment,6 expert opinions from
those specializing in the given area of medicine and the opinion of
respected medical organizations such as the American Medical As-
sociation. An example of such an exclusionary clause, which this
author opines should pass judicial muster reads:
Eligible expenses will include only charges for therapies which are recog-
nized as potentially safe and efficacious for the care and treatment of the
injury or sickness by the medical community, including the American Medi-
cal Association, The National Institute of Health, The Public Health Ser-
vice, and the Food and Drug Administration."
Requiring the insurer's policy to contain a list of reasonable ob-
jective criteria is needed for various important reasons. First, it
will force the insurance company to examine outside resources con-
cerning the disputed treatment, thereby preventing the insurance
company from being able to rely solely on the medical opinions of
those physicians in its employment, a procedure which invariably
is more inclined to disallowing reimbursement.68 Second, it puts
the insured-patient and her physician(s) on notice as to the evalua-
tive procedure by which the insurer will determine the status of
any treatment prescribed. Third, forcing the insurer to look at
outside, objective resources will cut down on the need for the judi-
ciary to have to conduct its own independent research on the "ex-
perimental" nature of the procedure. The research on the treat-
ment will have already been done and documented by the insurer
prior to litigation and, therefore, the court will more often be able
to merely examine whether the treatment falls under this more
specific definition in the policy rather than the underlying medical
question of what is "experimental," a question which the court is
typically not qualified to answer. Finally, this requirement is nec-
essary because unless objective criteria for determining what medi-
cal treatments are "experimental" is included in the insurance con-
tract, it is easy for a medically inexperienced court to improperly
conclude that: (1) the treatment is not experimental when it, in
fact, has not been proven safe and effective or; (2) the treatment is
66. There are some difficulties with requiring the parties to look to medical literature
on a given treatment in that: (1) some treatments are not conducive to rigorous studies in
that too few patients are willing to risk being put in the groups receiving the placebo and (2)
often a significant period of time elapses before the results of a study are published. Com-
ment, 66 Wash L Rev at 822 (cited in note 8).
67. Monaco and Burke, 20 Forum at 409 (cited in note 14).
68. See the definition section of the policy in Griffis, note 36 and the accompanying




experimental when it, in fact, has been proven to be safe and
effective."
Notably, it was this type of provision, where the insurer listed in
its policy the objective criteria it used to determine whether a
treatment was "experimental," which the Louisiana court in Wald-
rip found to be ambiguous and, therefore, held for the insured-
plaintiff. As stated earlier, the court reasoned that because the ex-
clusionary language referred to extrinsic sources it was impossible
for anyone to be able to quickly interpret whether or not the dis-
puted medical treatment constituted an "experimental" treat-
ment.70 While this is a facially logical argument against utilizing an
exclusionary provision based upon extrinsic objective sources, it is
this author's opinion that it is an unrealistic viewpoint. True the
insured-patient cannot merely look to see if the treatment is listed
in the policy as excluded from coverage because it is "experimen-
tal," but given the rapid advances in medical technology today, re-
quiring such a list is an impossible demand on the insurer.7'
3. The Use of Independent Medical Experts by the Court
When faced with health insurance reimbursement disputes, the
courts generally defer a great deal to medical experts when at-
tempting to determine whether or not a treatment is "experimen-
tal. 72 The necessity of this reliance is not disputed; the judiciary,
lacking the. requisite medical knowledge needed to make the neces-
sary determinations, needs the assistance of medical experts in de-
ciding whether a disputed medical treatment is, in fact, "experi-
mental." Indeed, this is a constant criticism of the court in this
area: that the judiciary has little understanding of the scientific
basis of medical knowledge and the differences between proven
and unproven therapies.73 Thus, the current policy of the courts to
listen to medical expert witnesses should continue.
The difficulty is, however, that the courts are commonly faced
69. Such a decision, as stated in the introduction, not only causes insurance costs to
rise unnecessarily, but also advocates the use of unproven medical treatments.
70. See note 50 and the accompanying text for this discussion. Specifically, the court
stated "Exclusions from coverage must be clear and unmistakable.". Waldrip, 566 S2d at
437.
71. Given the rapid advances in technology, the insurer would be forced to constantly
be changing the list of excluded "experimental" treatments, an unrealistic option. Moreover,
if the insurer was required to list every possible exclusion all that would result is a "sea of
print" which the insured-patient would likely not understand.
72. Molino, 11 J Health & Hosp L at 330 (cited in note 14).
73. Monaco and Burke, 200 Forum at 402 (cited in note 14).
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with expert witnesses from both sides, one explaining that the
treatment is "experimental" and the other claiming that the treat-
ment is one generally accepted in that field of practice. Assuming
arguendo that all the physicians testifying are respected individu-
als in their field, how is the court supposed to know whom to be-
lieve? Accordingly, it is this author's opinion that courts examining
the issue of whether a given medical treatment is "experimental"
should be required to retain the services of an unbiased physician
to whom they can ask questions so as to better understand the
medical procedure they are evaluating.1
4
4. Factors Which the Courts Should Not Be Allowed to
Consider in Making Their Determination
As stated earlier, in making its own determination of whether or
not a given medical treatment is "experimental," the courts have
considered a variety of factors.75 These considerations include two
major factors which this author argues a court should not be al-
lowed to consider in making this critical determination.
The first factor which courts should not be allowed to consider
in their analysis is the cost of the procedure.76 Simply stated, cost
has nothing to do with whether or not a medical treatment is "ex-
perimental." Thus, to include the cost of a medical procedure into
an already delicate equation is simply unwarranted and improper.
The second factor which a court should not be allowed to con-
sider as significant is the fact that all other treatments attempted
have been unsuccessful for this insured-patient. 77 If a court is per-
mitted to factor this into its evaluation, any medical treatment,
even one used for the very first time, could be deemed not "experi-
mental" because it is the insured-patient's last hope of survival.
The difficulty with this suggested reform is, of course, that it is
easy for a court to say that it has not taken this factor into consid-
eration in making its determination, and, yet, it is a hard fact for
the court, even in its subconscious, to forget.
74. The cost of this expert would be shared by the parties.
75. See note 53 and the accompanying text for a list of these factors.
76. See, for example, Johnson v District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F2d
514, 517 (9th Cir 1988).
77. Cline and Rosten state the reality of the situation: "[ilt is doubtful that any pol-
icy language can, as a practical matter, limit coverage where the treatment is new, novel and
unproven but, nevertheless, is prescribed by legitimate practitioners after all orthodox treat-
ments have failed." Cline and Rosten, 21 Tort & Ins LJ at 134 (cited in note 1). See Dozsa v
Crum & Forster Insurance Co., 716 F Supp 131, 139 (D NJ 1989) for an example of when a
court has considered this factor.
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C. One Last Suggestion
One last issue must be examined: what about the reasonable ex-
pectation of the insured-patient? What about the insured-patient
who went to her physician with a medical problem and was told
that a certain treatment was necessary for recovery (perhaps it is
even the only possible solution for her medical problem)?
If the insured-patient was told of the "experimental" nature of
the medical treatment, then there is no true dilemma. The patient
has the right to attempt to have her insurer pay for the policy, but
she should not reasonably expect to prevail. Rather, the difficulty
lies where the insured-patient was not told of the experimental na-
ture of the treatment and the insurance policy did not require
preapproval by the insurer of any medical treatments for which
the insured-patient desired to be reimbursed.
In this situation, does the insured-patient not have the right to
rely on her doctor's professional advice? There seems to be some
validity to the argument that, at least from an equitable point of
view, where an insured-patient, in good faith, proceeded with such
a medical treatment, the insurer should be able to implead the
practitioner in the dispute. That way the insured-patient is right-
fully reimbursed for the treatment she underwent at the suggestion
of her physician, but the physician, rather than the innocent in-
surer, is forced to pay the bill.
Such a solution should make the physician think more carefully
in the future about informing all of the involved parties about the
exact nature of the procedure, which will, in turn, accomplish the
dual goal of keeping insurance costs down and encouraging the
rendering of safe and effective medical treatments.
VII. CONCLUSION
No one will contest that some entity is needed to regulate the
denial by insurers of reimbursement of medical treatments neces-
sarily undergone and, supplementally, the providing of appropriate
medical treatment by physicians. Arguably the judiciary is not the
best party to be doing so. Perhaps the federal or state legislatures
should be stepping into this area of insurance reimbursement liti-
gation and attempting to solve this problem through legislation.
The difficulty is, however, that so far the legislative branch has not
so chosen to intervene in this area and there is no indication that it
intends to so act soon. Therefore, judicial review is all that there is
and everything must be done to make this judicial review the most
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effective it can possibly be.
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